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Abstract
Based on a switching-cost model, we examineempirically thehypotheses that bank loanmark-ups
arecountercycicaland asymmetric in their responsivenessto recessionaly and expansionary impulses.
The first econometric model treats changes in the mark-up as a continuousvariable. The second
treatsthem as an ordered categoricalvariable due to the discrete nature ofprime rate changes. By
allowing the variance to switch over time as a Markov process, we present the first conditionally
heteroscedastic discrete choice (ordered probit) model for time-series applications. This feature
yields a remarkable improvementin thelikelihood function. Specifications that do not account for
conditional heteroscedasticity find evidence of both countercyclical and asymmetric mark-up
behavior. Incontrast, the heteroscedastic ordered probit finds themark-upto be countercycical but
not significantly asymmetric. We explain why controlling forconditional heteroscedasticitymaybe
importantwhen testing for downward stickiness in loan rates.
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The observation that significant costs to customers of switching sellers can alter the na-
ture of competition among sellers has found applications inindustrial organization, macroe-
conomics and international trade [Kiemperer (1995)]. A key implication is that switching
costs make sellers imperfect competitors. An important example where switching costs
are thought to pertain is the relationship between banks and their loan customers. In
this article, we outline a model in which switching costs, combined with risk-averse bank
management, lead to countercyclical mark-ups in the pricing of bank loans. Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1995) find this motivation forcountercyclical mark-ups to have more empirical
basis than the idea that the degree of oligopolistic collusion is cyclical. This article presents
two empirical tests for countercyclical mark-ups in the bank prime lending rate.
Banks specialize in acquiring costly information about their business loan customers.
Consequently borrowers find it costly to switch from a lender who knows them to one who
does not. Once a relationship is established, one might conclude that a bank could extract
monopoly rents from its customers in the form of above-normal interest rates. Rajan
(1992), however, argues that such opportunistic behavior may not fit into a bank’s optimal
long-run strategy, because rival banks could capture its customers by sharing the switching
costs. Gilbert and Kiemperer (1995) discuss ways in which competition among sellers leads
to cooperation among buyers and sellers to mitigate the effects of switching costs.
Contracts in which sellers precommit to prices that compensate (at least partially)
3for start-up or switching costs serve this purpose. For example, business loans and lines
of credit are often contractually tied to the prime lending rate, the London Inter-Bank
Offering Rate (LIBOR) or other cost-of-funds indices. By tying loan rates to such indices,
banks effectively pre-commit to prices that are state dependent, where the state is the
prevailing index rate. In practice, a given loan’s terms will adjust at regular intervals,
based on a contractual agreement. An example would be to use the most recent monthly
average ofthe LIBOR rate as the benchmark to update a loan’s terms on a quarterly basis.
To test for countercyclical loan mark-ups, we need data on a loan index that includes
a mark-up above banks’ cost of funds.1 Consequently, we focus on the prime rate, even
though business borrowers might index to LIBOR plus a spread. In using the prime rate
as a benchmark forbank lending rates, it is important to recognize that banks sometimes
lend at rates below prime. Figure 1 shows the percentage ofshort-termand long-term loans
made at or above the prime rate. While the percentageofshort-term lending made at rates
below prime has increased, the percentageof long-term loans made at or above prime has
remained relatively steady. Moreover, because loans made at rates below prime may still
use the prime rate as an index (either by explicit or implicit agreement) for making rate
adjustments, a change in the prime tends to reflect a general shift in lending rates.
Although it serves as a precommitment device, the prevailing prime rate is not com-
pletely exogenous to a bank and certainly not to money-center banks as a group. Thus
banksjockey to be among the first to adjust their primerates while tryingto avoidexpensive
‘LIBOR rates closely follow rates on certificates of deposit, which measure the cost of funds to banks.
In fact, LIBOR rates denominated in other currencies also behave as ifthey were priced from bank deposit
rates in the United States covered by forward foreign exchange contracts.
4false starts. Imperfect competition renderedby switching costs leads a bank to consider the
trade-off between enhancing its market share and monopoly pricing of its existing customer
base. Several authors, including Chevalier and Scharstein (1994) and Klemperer (1995),
have observed that the business cycle can affect this trade-off if firms prefer smooth profit
streams. In cyclical downturns, firms with market power may smooth profits by charging
relatively high prices, rather than seeking to expand market share. In this vein, Hughes,
Lang, Mester and Moon (1995) present empirical evidence that bank managers behave
as if they have convex, non-risk-neutral preferences over their profit stream. Banks must
also consider that if they were to seek greater market share in a cyclical downturn, they
would faceadverse selection: the prospect oflending to businesses with the highest cyclical
probabilities of failure. For either of these reasons, profit smoothing or adverse selection,
cyclical downturns represent periods when bank managers would opt for a relatively high
price-cost margin instead ofgreater market share. Ifbank managers generally behave this
way, the prime rate should display a countercyclical mark-up.
In thenext sectionwe present a model in which a profit-smoothing manager ofa monop-
olistically competitive bank would choose a countercyclical mark-up in loan pric~lg.The
third section tests for a countercyclical mark-up empirically using weekly data. Because
the prime rate changes by discrete amounts on an irregular basis, we present results from
two estimation methods to scrutinize the robustness of the findings. The fourth section
concludes.
52. A model of countercycical loan mark-ups
Following Klemperer (1995), we argue that the existenceof switching costs gives banks
some degree of market power over their customer base. Consequently, bank managers can
increase current-period profits, ir, by increasing the mark-up, p, of their lending rates over
the marginal cost of loanable funds, but only at the cost of reducing their market share
heading into the future. Market share, a, is assumed to be a decreasing function of last
period’s mark-up:
at = a(pti), where a’ < 0.
Current-period profits are assumed to be a functionof the mark-up, current market share,
and an indexforthe phase ofthe business cycle, b, where largervaluesofbindicateeconomic
booms:
=
The profit function shifts up in booms, because a given market share generates higher
profits when credit demand is high. The choice variable is p.
As suggested by the empirical findings ofHughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (1995), bank
managers are assumed to prefer smooth profit streams. Thus, the preference function, U,
is concave in profit. The manager’s infinite-horizon objective function is then
max Eo~6tU(~t(pt,at(pt_i),bt)) (1)
{pt} ~=o
6where E is theexpectations operator and 6 is the subjective rate oftime preference. Equa-
tion (1) can take the recursiveform ofthe Bellman equation:
Vj(at,bt) = rnax{U(irt(pt,a~(p~_i),bt)) + SE~ Vt+i(at+i(pt),bt+i I b~)} . (2)
Thefirst-order condition is
ôU~ O1r~ ôV~.1ôa~~1 —0. (3)
ôir~ôp~ &Tt+1 Opt
The first-order condition equates the marginal benefit to current-period profits from raising
today’s price to the marginal cost of lost future profits from a diminished market share.
The total differential of the first-order condition with respect to p and b is
— — (U”irpir6 + U’7r~ + 6EtV~b(t + 1)a~+i) (4)
db~— U’ir~ + U”ir~ + 6E~ {1’~,.(t+ 1)a~~ + V~,(t + 1)(a~~1)2}
Sufficient conditions for an unambiguously negative sign in equation (4) are that
=0 and =0. Op~8b~
These conditions hold ifthe boom-bust state of the macroeconomy simply shifts a bank’s
profit function up and down without tilting its slope. Whether loan mark-ups are counter-
cyclical remains an empirical issue, however. The rest of the paper consists of two tests of
the validity of this proposition.
73. Empirical tests for a countercycical mark-up in the prime rate
The spread between the prevailing end-of-week prime rate and the weekly average rate
on 180-day certificates of deposit (CD) is a measure of the loan mark-up in the banking
industry.2 In the empirical analysis of loan mark-ups, it is assumed that banks obtain
additional loanable funds by bidding for deposits at prevailing market deposit rates. The
secondary-market CD rate is our measure of banks’ cost of funds. Other types of deposits
that affect banks’ cost of funds, such as money market and negotiable order withdrawal
accounts, were not available in the first part of our sample, which runs from January 1973
to February 1993. Our use of secondary-market quotes owes to the availability of such
data, which are representative of prevailing rates in retail markets.
The prime rate generally changes at less than a weekly frequency (a change occurred in
20% of the weeks in our sample) and by discrete amounts in increments of25 basis points or
more. Thus changes in the prime rate - CD rate spread fall into several size categories based
on the discrete change in the prime rate. Because changes in this interest rate spread are
lumpy and heteroscedastic, ordinary least squares estimation is inappropriate. Recognizing
this feature ofthe prime rate, other researchers have used discrete-choice models [Mester
and Saunders (1995)] or friction models [Forbes and Mayne (1989)]. The former model
consists of a simple logit model over short sample periods when the prime rate was either
consistently increasing or consistently decreasing. The friction model of Forbes and Maynes
(1989) imposes rigidity on the dependent variable, so it may remain unchanged in most
2All variables used in this study are weekly averages, except for the prime rate, which is the end-of-
week value. Data are from ilaver Analytics, except for the prime rate, which was taken from the Federal
Reserve’s data base.
8periods, but adjusts by any amount to its optimal level whenever it changes. To apply the
friction model, Forbes and Maynes (1989) used changes in the monthly average of the prime
rate to convert the discrete variable into a more continuous one. In our case, however, the
dependent variable is the change in the prime rate-CD rate spread. To ensure that the
changes in the components of the spread are essentially simultaneous, we use weekly data.
Monthly or quarterly averaging could mask or distort the timing of changes in the spread.
A test for countercyclical mark-ups in our sample requires a weekly indicator of the
cyclical state of the economy. Friedman and Kuttner (1993) identify and document the
remarkable ability of the spread between the commercial paper rate and the Treasury bill
rate to predict economic activity, especially recessions. Friedman and Kuttner offer several
explanations for the predictive power of the paper-bill spread including differential tax
treatments, default risk and monetary policy effects. The paper-bill spread does not give
equally clear signals of economic recoveries and booms, however.3 Figure 2 illustrates that
the paper-bill spread tends to increase prior to and throughout NBER recession dates,
with the exception of the 1990 recession.4 Despite its limitations, the paper-bill spread is
a useful indicator of the business cycle phase that is available at a weekly frequency.
An increase in the paper-bill spread corresponds with a cyclical downturn, which is
hypothesized to induce an increase in the loan mark-up according to equation (4). There-
fore, the coefficients on lagged changes in the paper-bill spread should be positive. We
also include lagged changes in deposit rates to account for the serial correlation observed
3We use weekly averagesof the six-month Treasury bill and commercial paper rates.
4Many other indices of leading indicators also failed to anticipate the 1990 recession.
9in interest rate changes. Furthermore, we partition the explanatory variables so as to esti-
mate separate coefficients for positive and negative changes, because Mester and Saunders
(1993) and others have observed that the prime rate is more responsive to impulses leading
to increases than decreases. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) observe similar asymmetries in
deposit rates.
Because we are primarily interested inthe overall, multi-period response of the mark-up
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That is, the reported coefficients and standard errors are for Fi = (i3~+ ... + /
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jc~. The lag lengths were chosen informally, based on whether
coefficients became insignificant at either four or six weeks; the same lag length was used for
explanatory variables partitioned into increases and decreases. The explanatory variables
are all lagged at least one period, so they are pre-determined relative to this week’s change
in the dependent variable. This avoids the problem of simultaneous determination of the
dependent variable and an endogenous explanatory variable.
A second proxy for economic conditions that is available at the weekly frequency is the
slope of the yield curve. Estrella and Mishkin (1995) describe the tendency of the yield
curve to become inverted prior to recessions, essentially because future short-term interest
10rates are expected to decline for a lengthy period of time if a recession ensues. Thus,
as a second test for countercyclical loan mark-ups, we use the slope of the yield curve,
lrt(TBond/TB), as a recession indicator, where TBond is the ten-year Treasury bond rate
and TB is the three-month Treasury bill rate.
To check for robustness, results from two different estimation methods are presented.
The first is an iteratively re-weighted least squares regression model of changes in the
mark-up with category-dependent intercepts and variances. The second is a heteroscedas-
tic ordered probit model of changes in the mark-up. To our knowledge, we are the first to
estimate a heteroscedastic ordered probit model, allowing for conditional heteroscedastic-
ity in a time-series application of a discrete-choice model. This feature seems particularly
important for a time-series model of interest rate changes, given that interest rates were
unusually volatile between 1979 and 1982. Moreover, the results strongly favor the condi-
tionally heteroscedastic specification over the usual homoscedastic version.
3.1 An asymmetric regression model of changes in the mark-up
In this model, the observations are divided into seven different categories based on the
size of the discrete change in the prime rate. Denoting the prime rate change as L~PR,
the seven categories are shown in Table 1. In practice, however, the prime rate has always
chailged by increments of 25 basis points.
11Table 1: Observation categories
based on size of prime rate change
category criterion frequency
1 ~PR<—.500 9
2 —.500 z~PR<—.250 52
3 —.250 ~ L~PR < —.125 38
4 —.125 ~ L~.PR ~ +.125 840
5 +.125<J~PR~+.250 62
6 +.250<~PR +.500 33
7 z~PR>+.500 14
The dependent variable is the weekly change in the prime rate - CD spread. The
intercept and residual variance are allowed to differ across categories.5
Estimation is carried out by iterative weighted least squares. Re-weighting takes place
because estimates of the category-specific residual variances and means are updated be-
tween regressions.6 Iterative weighted least squares converges to the maximum-likelihood
estimates in this case [Kmenta (1986)]. The log-likelihood function is
~ Z~ (_.51n(2~a~) - .S(yc - X~/3 - ~j)2/a~) (6)
t=1 1=1
where Z~is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is in category i at time t,
and 1~iand a~are the category-specific intercept and variance.
The commercial paper rate is denoted CP. Changes in the commercial paper-Treasury
5The category-based heteroscedasticity permitted here is distinct from conditional heteroscedasticity.
Conditional heteroscedasticityentails time dependence in the variance, as opposed to heterogeneities based
on the size category. We do not attempt to address these two forms of heteroscedasticity simultaneously
in the regression model. Instead, we deal with conditional heteroscedasticity in section 3.2.
6Estimation is carried out as follows: 1) Start with ordinary least squares estimates of the slope coeffi-
cients. 2) Calculate intercepts and residual variances by category. Use the residual variances to weight the
observations. 3) Estimate the weighted least squares regression. 4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 until convergence.
12bill rate spread and changes in the CD rate are partitioned into increases and decreases
denoted as INC and DEC, respectively. The slope of the yield curve, lrm(TBond/TB), is
partitioned into positive and negative values to indicate whether the yield curve is upward-
sloping or inverted. The coefficient estimates foriterative weighted least squares estimation
are in Table 2, where the F lag coefficients are defined below equation (5).
13Table 2: Iterative Weighted Least Squares







z~(CP — TB)(INC) F1 .679 (.165)
— TB)(DEC) F1 .182 (.159)
L~i(CP — TB)(INC) F2 .326 (.152)
L~~.(CP — TB)(DEC) F2 -.040 (.144)
Li(CP — TB)(INC) I’3 .263 (.125)
LI(CP — TB)(DEC) F3 -.042 (.120)
LI(CP — TB)(INC) F4 .105 (.096)
Li(CP — TB)(DEC) F4 -.088 (.092)
ln(TBond/TB)(POS) flu .831 (.519)
ln(TBond/TB)(NEG) /3~ -5.94 (2.42)
L~(CD)(INC) F1 .127 (.090) .221 (.085)
L~x(CD)(DEC) F~ .347 (.083) .233 (.075)
Li(CD)(INC) F2 .314 (.087) .369 (.085)
L~(CD)(DEC) F2 .320 (.075) .396 (.069)
L~.(CD)(INC) F3 .169 (.082) .190 (.081)
z~.(CD)(DEC) P3 .307 (.069) .354 (.065)
z~(CD)(INC) F4 .060 (.061) .063 (.075)
z~(CD)(DEC) F4 .149 (.065) .306 (.062)
z~(CD)(INC) F~ .133 (.046) .124 (.064)
z~(CD)(DEC) F~ .129 (.056) .154 (.056)
z~x(CD)(INC) F6 .170 (.092) .024 (.047)
L~(CD)(DEC) ~‘6 .127 (.043) .112 (.043)
Probability values for Wald tests
symmetry in both variables (p-value)
symmetry in L~(CP — TB) (p-value)








Two sets of results appear in Table 2, one based on using the paper-bill spread and
the other based on the yield-curve slope. The model-implied sign for the coefficient on the
paper-bill spread is positive, because an increase in the paper-bill spread ought to signal
a risk of recession and an increase in the loan mark-up. Conversely, a negative sign is
14implied for the slope ofthe yield curve, because lower values forthe slope signal recessions.
Lagged changes in the paper-bill spread are included to reflect that upward movements
signal recessions. The yield-curve slope is left in levels, because it is an inverted yield
curve, rather than a downward shift in slope, that signals a recession. The yield-curve
slope evolves slowly, so additional lags would contain roughly the same information as the
first lag. Hence only the first lag is included.
The sum of lag coefficients, F1, on the paper-bill spread is significantly positive, implying
that the loan mark-up increases with the paper-bill spread, i.e., before cyclical downturns,
as hypothesized. A Wald test of the hypothesis that the sum of lag coefficients is equal for
increases and decreases is rejected at the 5% level. These estimates suggest that the paper-
bill spread is more helpful foridentifying increases than decreasesin the loanmark-up. The
lack of responseto decreases in the paper-bill spread may reflect Friedman and Kuttner’s
(1993) conclusion that the paper-bill spread is a better indicator of recession than booms.
On the other hand, no asymmetry is apparent in the response of the mark-up to changes
in CD rates.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained with the yield curve slope. An inverted yield
curve significantly predicts increases in theloan mark-up, but a positively sloped yield curve
has no significant predictive power. A Wald test for the inequality of the /
3
i coefficients
across positive and negative slopes confirms this asymnmmetry. Either the paper-bill spread
or the yield-curve slope is a predictor of the timing of increases but not decreases in the
loan mark-up.
153.2 A heteroscedastic ordered probit model of changes in the mark-up
The regression model from section 3.1 treated changes in the prime rate - deposit rate
mark-up as a continuous variable, even though the prime rate has always changed by
discrete amounts. To check for sensitivity, we also treat the dependent variable as an
ordered categorical variable. Table 3 shows the seven categories of changes in the mark-
up. These categories are similar to those in Table 1, but here they are used to define a
categorical dependent variable, whereas in the weighted regression they gave groupings for
category-specific means and variances for a continuous dependent variable.
Table 3: Observation categories
based on size of change in loan mark-up
category criterion frequency
1 z~mark-up < — .500 29
2 —.500 ~ L~mark-up < —.250 81
3 —.250 ~ L~mark-up < —.125 131
4 —.125 ~ L~mark-up~ +.125 558
5 +.125 < ~mark-up ~ +.250 137
6 +.250 < ~mark-up +.500 75
7 ~mark-up> +.500 32
We define seven dummy variables, Z3,j = 1, .., 7, where Z3t = 1 if the change in the
mark-up is in category j at time t. An ordered probit model includes constants c5 > c4>
> c1 and the following probabilities ofbeing in each of the seven categories:
Prob(Z7
= 1) =
Prob(Zs = 1) = ~(X/3 + ci) — ~(X/3)
Prob(Zs = 1) = 4~(Xfi + c2) — ~(X/3+ Ci)
Prob(Z4
= 1) = ~(X/3 + c3) — ~(X/3 + c2)
16Prob(Z3
= 1) = ~(X/3 + c4) — ~(X/3+ c3)
Prob(Z2
= 1) = ~(Xfl + c5) — ~(X/9 + c4)
Prob(Z1=1) = 1—~(X,8+cs) (7)
where ~(.) is the cumulative standard normal density function, X is a vector ofexplanatory
variables including an intercept and ~3is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated.
These probabilities stem from the maintained hypothesis of a probit model, which is that
the value ofX/3 and an unobservable mean-zero, normally distributed shock determinethe
category to which an observation belongs.7 If the shock has variance a2, then we should
formally write the Prob(Zm = 1), for example, as~ Inthe usual orderedprobit model
where the variance is constant, only ~ is identified, so it is customary to normalize a = 1
in order to identify /3 and the constants, c1, .., cs.
The constant-variance assumption is not desirable for a weekly time series of interest
rate changes in light of the interest-rate volatility witnessed from 1979 to 1982. For this
reason, we introduce a conditionally heteroscedastic probit model suitable for time-series
applications. One reason time-series applications ofdiscrete-choice models have heretofore
not allowed for conditional heteroscedasticity is that popular techniques, such as the Au-
toregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) model ofEngle (1982), are not applicable
to discrete choice models, because thethe residualsare latent variables. This difficulty does
not appear, however, if the variance changes over time as a discrete random variable. We
operationalize this form of heteroscedasticity by allowing a to vary over time as a binary
7Note that the conditionally heteroscedastic random disturbance is a continuous, non-categorical ran-
dom variable.





Prob(at = 1 I aj_1
= 1)
Prob(at = a1 I at_i = a1)
Normalizing the variance to one in the low-variance state permits identification of /3. The
transition probabilities, p and q, indicate the persistence ofthe volatility states and deter-
mine the unconditional probability ofthe low-variance state to be (1 — q)/(2 — p — q). In
this case, the Prob(Z7t = 11 cit = 1) = ~(Xfl) and Prob(Z7t = 11 cit = ai) =
Bayes’ Rule is used to obtain filtered probabilities ofthe states in order to integrateout the
unobserved volatility states and evaluate the likelihood function, as in Hamilton (1990):
Prob(at = a1 I Zt_i)Prob(Z~~ = 1! at = a1)
Prob(aj = a1 I = 1) = 1 (8)
~s=0 Prob(at = a~ I Zt_i)Prob(Z3t = 1 I cit = a3)
Prob(at = a1 I Z~_1) = qProb(at_1
= a1 I
— p)Prob(at_i = 1 I Z~_1) (9)
18The function maximized is then
T7 /1
~ Z2tln Prob(at = a3 I Zt_i)Prob(Z,t = 1 = a3)) (10)
t=1j~1 s=0
In maximizing equation (10), the explanatory variables are lagged changes in the paper-
bill spread and lagged changes in the 180-day CD rate, with the variables partitioned into
increases and decreases as before.8 Positive coefficients on the changes in the paper-bill
spread are consistent with a countercyclical mark-up, because signs of recession ought to
make the probabilities ofincreases in the loan mark-up more likely (categories 7; 6; 5).
The allowance for conditional heteroscedasticity via Markov-switching variance in the
ordered probit improvedthe log-likelihood tremendously from -1458 to -1389. Counting the
two transition probabilities, the addition ofthree parameters produces a large difference in
the likelihoodfunction. In testing the significanceof the conditional heteroscedasticity, the
likelihood-ratio test statistic does not have a standard chi-square distribution, because the
transition probabilities are not identified under the null. Nevertheless, the difference is so
large that it appears likely that the extra parameters are significant, because even the true
non-standard distribution is not so different from a chi-square to raise the critical value
from 7.81 to 140.
The standard deviation of the disturbances, a, is about 2.5 times as large in the high-
variance state with an almost 95% chance ofremaining in that stateanother period. Figure
8We do not present ordered-probit results for the specification that uses the yield-curve slope as the
indicator of macroeconomic conditions, because the coefficients were not significantly different from zero.
193 provides a plot of the smoothed probabilities of the high-variance state over the sample
period. Not surprisingly, the most notable high-volatility episode corresponds with the
1979-82 period. The second most important high-volatility period was 1974-75. The fact
that high-volatility periods coincided with three ofthe fourrecessions contained in our sam-
ple highlights the importanceofcontrolling for conditional heteroscedasticityand weighting
the observations appropriately when testing hypotheses related to the cyclicality of vari-
ables, such as the mark-up in bank lending rates.
20Table 4: Heteroscedastic Ordered Probit
Estimation of Changes in Loan Mark-Up
Asymmetric Model
st. errors are in parentheses
variable parameter heteroscedastic constant variance
log-lik. -1388.7 -1457.8
L~X(CP — TB)(INC) F1 5.61 (1.33) 4.03 (.840)
L~(CF — TB)(DEC) F1 2.67 (1.19) 1.34 (.802)
L~.(CP — TB)(INC) F2 1.82 (1.11) 1.59 (.753)
Ls~(CP — TB)(DEC) F2 .253 (1.04) .067 (.715)
— TB)(INC) P3 1.73 (.951) 1.33 (.625)
LX(CP — TB)(DEC) F3 -.247 (.875) -.11 (.599)
— TB)(INC) F4 1.27 (.667) 1.04 (.449)
~(CP — TB)(DEC) P4 -.234 (.656) -.18 (.441)
L~(CD)(INC) F1 1.06 (.598) .293 (.390)
L~(CD)(DEC) F1 1.29 (.516) .947 (.328)
Li(CD)(INC) F2 2.52 (.593) .948 (.394)
L~(CD)(DEC) F2 1,39 (.517) 1.01 (.321)
~x(CD)(INC) F3 2.26 (.573) .622 (.373)
L~(CD)(DEC) F3 1.43 (.471) 1.13 (.304)
z~(CD)(INC) P4 .952 (.526) .158 (.339)
L~(CD)(DEC) F4 1.75 (.485) 1.22 (.283)
L~(CD)(INC) F5 1.02 (.439) .532 (.288)
A~(CD)(DEC) P5 .878 (.403) .559 (.238)
z~.(CD)(INC) F~ .341 (.366) .079 (.221)
z~(CD)(DEC) F6 .646 (.314) .557 (.188)
high variance a1 2.48 (.203) 1
transition prob. p .977 (.008) n.a.
transition prob. q .946 (.017) n.a.
c1 1.67 (.269) .703 (.076)
c2 2.61 (.294) 1.24 (.083)
C
3 4.59 (.317) . 2.77 (.093)
C
4 5.40 (.334) 3.37 (.100)
C
5 6.95 (.462) 4.05 (.119)
Wald tests for symmetry






The results for the heteroscedastic ordered probit in Table 4 show that the sums of coef-
21ficients, F1, arepositive and significant. The null hypothesis ofsymmetry is not rejected for
the paper-bill spread, despite the fact that the estimated total response, F1, for increases
is more than double that for decreases. Hence, while the heteroscedastic ordered probit
model and the weighted least squares regression concur that the loan mark-up is coun-
tercyclical, they reach opposite conlusions regarding the significance of asymmetry in the
mark-up’s response to increases and decreases in the paper-bill spread. The failure to reject
the symmetry hypothesis in the heteroscedastic ordered probit model also runs counter to
the asymmetry foundin logit models by Mester and Saunders (1995) regarding the response
ofthe prime rate to positive and negative impulses. The treatment of heteroscedasticity is
a likely explanation ofthe difference in results, because a constant-variance ordered probit
also finds significant evidence of asymmetry in the mark-up’s response to changes in the
paper-bill spread.
A further argument supporting this explanation begins by noting that the estimated
standard errors of the coefficients will not be consistent if conditional heteroscedasticity
is not addressed. Furthermore, the estimated standard errors ought to be biased down-
ward. The second derivative ofthe ordered probit log-likelihood with respect to the slope
coefficients is proportional to XtX/a?, where X is the vector ofexplanatory variables. In
the constant-variance ordered probit, a is normalized to one, whereas in the heteroscedas-
tic ordered probit, the unconditional value of a is greater than one. When applying the
two models to the same data (same XtXfl, we would expect the heteroscedastic model to
have larger standard errors. The apparent degree of precision in the estimates from the
22constant-variance ordered probit gives it considerable power to reject symmetry, even when
symmetry holds, i.e., the test has the wrong size when it is presumed that a is constant.
The difference in the standard errors for F1 in Table 4 between the heteroscedastic and
constant-variance models conforms with this argument. Hence the failure to address het-
eroscedasticity can lead to misplaced confidence in the significance of parameter estimates
pointing toward downward stickiness of the loan mark-up. In general, our results highlight
the importance of controlling for conditional heteroscedasticity and weighting the observa-
tions correctly when testing hypotheses related to the cyclicality and symmetry ofinterest
rates, such as the mark-up in bank lending rates.
Conclusions
A switching cost model along the lines of Kiemperer (1995), together with the assump-
tion that bank managers are risk-averse with respect to volatile profit streams, yields the
prediction that the mark-up on bank loans is countercyclical. The maintained assumption
that managers are not risk-neutral seems reasonable for firms whose equity value depends
greatly on the value of a legal charter and goodwill, as opposed to tangible capital.
Using Friedman and Kuttner’s (1993) observation that the commerical paper - Treasury
bill rate spread is a predictor of the economy’s cyclical behavior and its availability at the
weekly frequency, we obtain evidence from two econometric models. The first, iteratively
weighted least squares, finds evidence of both a countercyclical mark-up and asymmetry
in the mark-up’s response to recessionary versus expansionary impulses. The second, a
23conditionally heteroscedastic orderedprobit model (the first discrete-choice model to allow
for conditional heteroscedasticity in a time-series application), finds evidence of a counter-
cyclical mark-up but not asymmetry. Because the constant-variance ordered probit model
also finds asymmetric responses, it appears that the finding of asymmetry may result from
not addressing the heteroscedastic nature of the interest-rate data.
In other contexts, countercyclical mark-ups have been attributed to capital market
“imperfections,” as in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1994), perhaps suggesting room for policy
intervention. In the banking market, however, a firm could avoid switching costs only by
making publicly available (most notably to its rivals) details of its strategic plans. Thus,
while loan mark-ups appear to be significantly countercyclical, any attempt to attentuate
business cycles by mitigating switching costs would likely entail a cure more expensivethan
the problem.
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25Figure 1. Percentage ofBusiness Loans Made at or Above
the Prime Lending Rate
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